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NOTES.
CORPORATIONS-PAYMENT TO A DIRECTOR TO LOOK AFTER PAR-

TICULAR INTERESTS--Is an agreement, made by a person having the
right to nominate a director in a corporation, to pay comp.ensation
to that director for so acting, enforceable? This question arose in
a recent English case, and the Supreme Court of Judicature by a
divided bench, decided it in the affirmative.'
A corporation in financial difficulties applied to the defendant,
a financier, to come to its assistance by supplying additional capital
in payment of shares therein. He agreed to do so on condition that
he be given two representatives on the board. The agreement with
this condition was approved and ratified at a general meeting of
shareholders. The defendant thereupon advanced the capital and
appointed the plaintiff to act as representative with him on the board
to look after his interests. He promised to pay the plaintiff for his
'Kregor v. Holins, 1O9 L. T. Rep. 225 (913).
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services two hundred pounds a year as long as he remained director,
and told him to see to it that the directors did not draw any fees
from the company. Neither the directors nor the company knew of
this private arrangement between the plaintiff and the defendant.
After acting as the defendant's representative for a year and a half,
the plaintiff resigned. He sued the defendant for compensation in
accordance with their agreement. The defense was that the agreement was illegal, as it might have been used by the plaintiff against
the interest of the company, his principal. The jury found that the
agreement did not contemplate that the plaintiff should promote the
interests of the defendant even though they were not identical with
those of the company.
Opposed to the strong dissent of Lord Justice Vaughan Williams, the two other judges came to the conclusion that the agreement was not illegal or secret. They decided that when, at the general meeting, the shareholders approved the contract with the defendant, they also in effect gave their approval to any arrangements
that might naturally arise under the contract for the purpose of
giving effect to it. An arrangement to pay the plaintiff a salary was
such as should have been contemplated, since the plaintiff was, at
the defendant's request, performing services for him. The majority
judges did not consider the agreement to pay the plaintiff a bribe to
induce him to do anything wrong, but rather a payment for services
rendered at defendant's request for the benefit of the company.
The dissenting Justice held that it was error for the court to
have submitted to the jury the question as to whether the parties
had contemplated that the plaintiff should look after the defendant's interests even where in conflict with those of the company. "In
my opinion, if the agreement was such that it might possibly be employed to the detriment of the shareholders at large, one must not
speculate as to whether in its application the plaintiff intended to
use it for such purpose. . . . And I think that the question whether
the agreement was illegal, or, in other words, inconsistent with the
duty of the other director as trustee for the company, is a question
of law and not of fact." He comes to the conclusion that this
arrangement viewed in this manner was illegal, as a matter of law.
On the questions as discussed by the court, there are certain
well-recognized rules as to the receipt of secret profits, gratuities,
etc., by a director of a corporation.2 The doctrine in equity that a
trustee will not be permitted, without the knowledge and consent of
his cestui que trust, to speculate out of his trust or to retain any gain
or secret profits which may have accrued to him personally from the
trust relation, is applied with full force to directers of corporations.8
See 2 Thompson on Corporations, §1234, et seq.
'Robertson v. Bucklen & Co., o7 Ill. App. 36o (9o3) ; Parker v. Nickerson, 112 Mass. 195 (1873); Barnes v. Brown, 8o N. Y. 527 (i88o); Simons v.

Vulcan Oil Co., 6i Pa. 2o2 (i869).
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In accordance with this rule a corporation may compel a director to
account to it for gains or secret profits resulting from contracts or
dealings of third persons with the corporation.4
In such case, the director cannot interpose as his defense the
fact that the transaction in which he made the secret profits was
also of advantage to the corporation." A director must likewise
account for and surrender to the corporation any gifts, gratuities or
bribes received by him for the purpose of influencing his official
action in a matter pending before the board."
Where, however, the profits are not secret nor illegal, there is
no such obligation on the part of the director to account to the corporation. If, therefore, the director acts bona fide and honestly,
and all the facts of the contract or transaction are known to the
board of directors, who are informed of his connection with it, and
such contract or transaction is advantageous to the corporation, he
may retain such profits, provided, also, that his vote was not essential to complete the contract or transaction. 7 A fortiori, he may retain such profits if the stockholders are fully acquainted with all
the facts and ratify the contract or transaction."
The principal case can therefore be explained on the reasoning
of the majority of the court,-that the arrangement between the
plaintiff and defendant was contemplated by the stockholders when
they ratified the agreement to give the defendant two representatives on the board of directors. In such case, the arrangement was
not a breach of the duty which the plaintiff owed to his principal,
the corporation; but it was rather within the purview of the original
agreement.
N.I.S.G.

EQUITY JURISDICTION-MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS-The courts
are not unanimous as to whether equity has jurisdiction to enjoin the
prosecution of numerous actions arising out of the same tortious act,

'Loudenslager v. Woodbury, etc., Co., 56 N. J. E. 411 (1897); Coombs v.
Barker, 31 Mont. 526 (19o5);

Perry v. Tuskaloosa, etc., Co., 93 Ala. 364

(i8go).
Bird Coal & Iron Co. v. Humes, 157 Pa. 278 (1893); Parker v. Nickerson, supra, n. 3.
'Campbell v. Cypress Hill Cemetery, 41 N. Y. 34 (1865) ; In re Caerphilly
Colliery Co. (Pearson's Case), L. R. 5 Ch. D. 336 (Eng. 1877); 2 Thompson
on Corporations, §1237, et seq.
T

Kregor v. Hollins, supra; Nathan v. Whitehill, 67 Hun. 398 (N. Y.

1893); Burland v. Earle, 85 L. T. 553 (Eng. 19o2); Pneumatic Gas Co. v.

Berry, 113 U. S. 322 (1885).

"In re British, etc., Box Co., L. R. 17 Ch. D. 467 (Eng. i88i); Tenison
-r. Patton, 95 Tex. 284 (1902).
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in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits. The case of Davis v. Forrestal I sustains the view that an injunction does not lie where the
different plaintiffs have no community of interest in the subjectmatter of the suits.
Among the first text writers to discuss this question was Mr.
Pomeroy who drew the following classification wherein equity might
interfere to prevent a multiplicity of suits. 2 (i) Where the injured
party is obliged to bring a number of actions against the same wrongdoer, all growing out of the one wrongful act and involving similar
questions of fact and law, e. g., nuisance, waste and continued trespass. (2) Where one party institutes or is about to institute a number of actions against another, all depending upon the same legal
questions and similar issues of fact, e. g., where repeated actions of
ejectment to recover the same tract of land have been brought. (3)
Where a number of persons have separate and individual claims and
rights of action against the same party, but all arise from some common cause, are governed by the same legal rule, and involve similar
facts, and the whole matter might be settled in a single suit brought
by all these persons uniting as co-plaintiffs, e. g., the case of several
owners of distinct parcels of land suing to enjoin the collection of
an illegal tax which has been laid thereon. (4) Where one party
claims some common right against a number of persons, the establishment of which would regularly require a separate action brought
by him against each of these persons, or brought by each of them
against him, he may procure the whole to be determined in one suit
brought by himself against all the adverse claimants as co-defendants.
Under "conclusions as to the third and fourth classes," the author
states that in those suits, "which are strictly and technically 'bills of
peace,' in order that a court of equity may grant the relief and thus
exercise its jurisdiction on the ground of preventing a multiplicity
of suits, there does and must exist among the individuals composing
the numerous body, or between each of them and their single adversary, a common right, a community of interest in the subject-matter
of the controversy, or a common title from which all their separate
claims and all the questions at issue arise"; and then adds that the
jurisdiction "has long been extended to other cases of the third and
fourth classes, which are not technically 'bills of peace,' but 'are
Rep. 423 (Minn. 1913). However, in refusing to take juris144 N. WV.
diction, the court considered the situation of the parties, their legal remedies
in actions at law, the undoubted right of each to a jury trial, the limited
number of suits necessary to settle the controversies involved, the different
facts that would go to measure the damages between the different litigants
even on plaintiff's showing, and the issues that might be anticipated from
the defendants.
21 Pomeroy, Eq. Jurisp. (3rd Ed.), §245.
' I Pomeroy, Eq. Jurisp. (3rd Ed.), §§268, 269.
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analogous to' or 'within the principle of' such bills"; and "the jurisdiction may and should be exercised, either on behalf of a numerous
body of separate claimants against a single party, or on behalf of a
single party against such a numerous body, although there is no
'common title,' nor 'community of right' or of 'interest in the subjectmatter,' among these individuals, but where there is and because
there is merely a community of interest among them in the questions
of law and fact involved in the general controversy, or in the kind
and form of relief demanded and obtained by or against each individual member of the numerous body."
These conclusions of Pomeroy are reviewed and controverted in
the much-famed case of Tribette v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co.,4 in which
Chief Justice Campbell says that the cases cited in support of Pomeroy's view establish the proposition that "where each of several may
proceed or be proceeded against in equity, their joinder as plaintiffs
or defendants in one suit is not objectionable." But this is quite different from the proposition that equity will grant relief merely
because many actions at law arise out of the same transactions or
occurrence, and depend on the same matters of law and fact. Possibly the best reason for equity refusing to take jurisdiction is that
the parties would be deprived of the constitutional guarantee, trial
by jury. Every man has the right to try his case with its issue clear
and well defined, but if a consolidation can be had without interfering with his right, it should be granted in a proper case; if it cannot be so had, it should be denied. 5
The opinion of Justice Harlan in Osborne, et al., v. Wisconsin
Cent. R. R. Co." supports the text of Pomeroy, but it will be noted
7o Miss. 182, 187 (1892). It is conceded that later Mississippi decisions
have in effect departed from the Tribette Case, but they have not done so
expressly. See in particular Hightower Crawford, et al., v. Railroad Co.,
83 Miss. 708, 717 (19o3) ; Whitlock v. Railroad Co., 91 Miss. 779, 784 (9o7) ;
G. & S. I. R. Co. v. Barnes, 94 Miss. 484, 510 (19o9). However, the case
of Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Williamson, 57 So. Rep. 559,
563 (Miss. 1912), unqualifiedly affirms the decision in the Tribette Case, conceding it to be "the leading authority in the world upon the question of the
jurisdiction of equity to prevent a multiplicity of suits." Mr. Pomeroy, in his
third edition on Equity Jurisprudence, devotes a great deal of space and
attention to the Tribette Case, and adds two new sections (2513/2 and 251Y4)
to that edition to set himself right in this matter. Although he does criticise
some things said by Chief Justice Campbell in that case, yet, in the notes to
his text, he admits that the decision was correct.
'Vandalia Coal Co. v. Lawson, 43 Ind. App. 226, 249 (19o8).
643 Fed. Rep. 824, 827 (i89O). In Wyman v. Bowman, 127 Fed. Rep.
257, 263 (9o4), general passages occur which are perhaps broad enough to
uphold Pomeroy's view, but the case may be distinguished on its facts. The
case of Hale v. Allison, i88 U. S. 56 (1902), contains language in the nature
of a dictum at the foot of page 78 tending to uphold the doctrine laid down
by Pomeroy, at least in part, in some cases; but on the previous page the
general rule as laid down by him is distinctly repudiated.
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that in this case equity had jurisdiction for other reasons than to
avoid a multiplicity of actions. Later decisions 7 in the federal courts
have repudiated Pomeroy's doctrine, and cite with approval the leading Mississippi case."
The better view and the one supported by the weight of authority
is that of the principal case to the effect that equity will not take
jurisdiction where there is no community of interest in the subjectmatter The distinction between what does and what does not constitute a community of interest is well illustrated by the following
quotation: "Two or more owners of mills propelled by water are interested in preventing an obstruction above that shall interfere with
the downflow of the water, and may unite to restrain it or abate it as
a nuisance; but they cannot hence.unite in an action for damages,
for, as to the injury suffered, there is no community of interest." 'o
The "right" controverted must be of a peculiar character. It must be
a common right, enjoyed in common by several persons, and in such
invasion
a manner that the invasion of the right of one
1 is really an
of the rights of all, such as a right of fishery.
The trend of modem decisions seems to abandon the old and
technical forms and for the sake of lessening litigation and saving
time and expense, courts of equity will assume jurisdiction
wherever they find that the consolidation will not confuse the issue,
will not bring so many questions or varied interests into a case that
separately,
they cannot be as well decided as if the cases were tried
12
and will not work a practical denial of a trial by jury.
W. G. S.

LIBEL-PRIVILEGE-REPORT

BY TRADE PROTECTION SOCIETY-

An unusual decision has lately come down from the Court of Appeals of England I upon the question of privilege of communication
as a defense in actions of libel and slander against mercantile agencies. The defendant was a mutual association of tradesmen, main"Washington County, Neb., v. Williams, iiI Fed. Rep. 8o, 812 (19OI);
Kansas City S. R. Co. v. Quigley, I8T Fed. Rep. Igo, 196 (igo).
'Tribette v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., supra, n. 4.
91 High, Injunctions (4th Ed.), §65a; Southern Steel Co. v. Hopkins, I74
Ala. 465 (1911) ; Roanoke Guano Co. v. Saunders, 173 Ala. 347 (19I1), overruling Southern Steel Co. v. Hopkins, 157 Ala. 175 (i9o8) ; Vandalia Coal Co.
v. Lawson, supra, n. 5; Tribette v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., supra, n. 4; Ducktown v. Fain, IOW Tenn. 56 (19o2) ; Illinois Steel Co. v. Shroder 133 Wis.
56i (1907).
10 Bliss, Code Pl. (3rd Ed.), §76.
112 Story, Eq. Jurisp. (i3th Ed.), §§854-856.
,2Cases cited, supra, n. 9.
1 Greenlands Lt'd v. Wilmshurst, et al., iog L. T. Rep. 487 (913).
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taining an office and secretary for securing information as to solvency and credit of customers generally. In this instance, inquiry
having been made by one of the members concerning the standing
of the plaintiff, the secretary wrote to a collecting agency in the
plaintiff's city making inquiry. The report, for which a payment
was made by the secretary, being unfavorable was forwarded to the
first inquirer. Later it was found to be false; the jury finding express malice in the making of it by the collecting agency. Upon the
plea of privileged communication entered by the mercantile association, Vaughn Williams, L. J., held the occasion of the communication was in nowise privileged. The information had been obtained
for a fee from one who was neither servant nor agent of the group
or any member of it. The court placed its decision alternatively upon
McIntosh v. Dun,2 saying "if it be law that persons who supply information and make a profit thereby, cannot set up privilege as a
defense, it seems to follow that if a person buys information he
cannot rely upon the information so bought as information given
on a privileged occasion." The decision, Bray, L. J., dissenting, was
admittedly contrary to the rule of Scotland,3 Ireland,4 Canada,, and
the American jurisdictions.
The occasion here falls under the classification, common to most
writers, 6 of conditional or qualified privilege. This is not the case
of a general publication to a large group, some of whom have no
interest in the communication; but is made upon specific inquiry
to a member of the association who has an interest in knowing the
credit ratings of a single person. While the two English cases have
thrown great doubt upon whether there is ever any privilege in
making communications of mercantile agencies, under the English
law, there can be few accepted cases found in America which are in
accord.7 Generally defamatory statements of a mercantile agency
made by it or its agents in answer to inquiries from, interested subscribers in confidence and good faith are privileged.8 This rule, of
L. T. Rep. 64 (igo8).
'Bayne v. Stubbs, 3 F. 408; Keith v. Lauder, 8 F. 356; Barr v. Musselburgh Merch. Ass'n (1912) Sess. Cas. i74.
' Fitzsimmons v. Duncan, 2 Ir. Rep. 483, 498 (i9o8).
'Lemay v. Chamberlain, io Ont. 638 (1886); Todd v. Dun, 12 Ont. 791
(1888).
'Odgers on Libel and Slander (4th Ed.), 234; Starkie on Slander and
Libel, 320; Townshend on Slander and Libel, 417, et seq.
'Beardsley v. Tappan, 5 Blatch. C. C. Rep. 498 (U. S. 1867); but this
case is effectively criticized and rejected in Trussell v. Scarlett, i8 Fed. Rep.
214, to which is appended a case note by Francis Wharton.
'Erber v. Dun, 12 Fed. Rep. 526 (1882); Pollansky v. Minchener, 8I
Mich. 2& (i8go); King v. Patterson, 49 N. J. L. 419 (1887); Ormsby v.
Douglas, 37 N. Y. 477 (1868) ; Laning v. Lonsdale, 48 Wis. 348 (1879) ; Trus299
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course, gives ample protection against indiscriminate publication
among subscribers generally who have no interest in the mercantile
standing of the plaintiff.0 In ruling the question of privilege, the
American courts usually proceed from the broad view of the question as enunciated in Harrison,v. Bush,' that "a communication
made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty,
is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or
duty, although it contained criminatory matter which, without this
privilege, would be slanderous and actionable. . . . Duty cannot be confined to legal duties which may be enforced by indictment, action, or mandamus, but must include moral and social duties
of imperfect obligation." One merchant desiring to enter into a
transaction with a purchaser has an interest in knowing, and a right
to know their character and standing, and to secure this may inquire
of another merchant, and if such merchant or other person communicates in good faith, the information he has, the occasion is
privileged." He may require the services of another to secure him
this information,' 2 and is but a logical step, in view of efficient
business administration to allow the union or association of several
having a common agent to secure such information and place it at
the confidential disposition of the members of the association in response to a specific inquiry. "In short, the inquiry is not, how did
the defendant acquire the information, nor whether he received compensation for the information he had gained, but was the occasion
one which justified him in giving such information as he possessed
to the applicant." ""
But the Court of Appeals took the view that duty or justification could not be shown to exist among the members when the
actual communication was secured for a payment; that the duty to
make the communication musi attain the rank of a duty to society,
to do what is for the good of society.
J.C.A.

sel v. Scarlett, supra, n. 7; Sunderlin v. Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. I88 (187);

Lewis v. Chapman, i6 N. Y. 369, 375 (1857) ; Denney v. N. W. Credit Ass'n,
io4 Pac. Rep. 769 (Wash. igog).
'No privilege in such communications, Erber v. Dun; Trussell v. Scar-"
lett; Ormsby v. Douglas; Laning v. Lonsdale, supra, n. 8; Taylor v. Church,
8 N. Y. 452 (853); Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co., iI6 Mo. 226 (x893); Com. v.
Stacey, 8 Phila. 617 (i87i) ; Gassett v. Gilbert, 6 Gray 94 (Mass. 1856).
'"5 E. & B. 344 (Eng. 1855).
"Cases cited, supra, n. 8; Odgers, 243; Errant on Mercantile Agencies,
pp. 32-42.
Orrmsby v. Douglas, 37 N. Y. 485 (i868).

"Ormsby v. Douglas, supra, n.

12.
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TRADEMARKS-UNFAIR

COMPETITION-ExcLUSIVE

RIGHTS

IN

GEOGRAPHICAL NAME-The distinction between prohibitive relief
from infringement of a technical trademark and regulative relief
from unfair competition, established comparatively recently in the
courts, is of great importance to the manufacturer seeking protection,
and concerns both the facts to be proved in order to make out a
case and the extent of the relief to be granted. A trademark is
usually held to be a property right, the mere infringement of which
will give a right to relief.: Relief from unfair competition is not
based on an infringement of a property right, but rather, as its name
indicates, the right to be free from an injurious competition which
A

passes the bounds of fairness. 2 Whereas in a "technical trademark"

case the complainant need only show his right to the trademark and
the infringement thereof, in an "unfair competition" case he must
show an intent to injure and actual damage resulting from the deceit
of the public. 3 The gist of the action in the latter class of cases is
the palming off on the public the goods of one man as the goods of
another; if the public is not deceived, the competition cannot be
called unfair. The relief granted against unfair competition can only
be co-extensive with the actual competition,4 whereas the protection
of a trademark will not be limited to the district in which the complainant's goods are sold.5
It is settled law that a geographical name can never become a
valid trademark. 6 If it has acquired a secondary meaning, it may
be entitled to some protection from unfair competition, but never to
the complete protection which is given a trademark, because to allow
this would be to give one man a monopoly of the goods of the particular kind produced in the plate in question. 7 An exception to this
strict rule has been made in the case of a geographical name which

1 Lawrence Mf'g Co. v. Tennessee Mf'g Co., 138 U. S. 537, 548 (089o);
Derringer v. Plate, 29 Cal. 292 (1866); Dennison Mf'g Co. v. Thomas Mf'g
Co., 94 Fed. Rep. 651-659 (1899).
'Dennison Co. v. Thomas Co., supra, n. i.
'Church v. Russ, 9 Fed. Rep. 276 (igoo); Lawrence Co. v. Tennessee
Co., supra; Elgin Watch Co. v. Ill. Watch Co., 179 U. S. 665 (igoo); Goodyear Co. v. Goodyear Co., 128 U. S. 598 (i888).

'Briggs v. National Wafer Co., 215 Mass. lOO (1913).

For a discussion

of the geographical extent of protection against unfair competition see 62
U. OF PA. LAw REv. 5o (November, 1913).

'Derringer v. Plate, 29 'Cal. 292 (1866) ; Kidd v. Johnson, 1oo U. S. 6t7
(i879) ; Hygeia Water Co. v. Consolidated Ice Co., i44 Fed. Rep. 139 (1906).
The recent case of Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Allen and Wheeler Co., 2o8
Fed. Rep. 513 (913), is contra to these cases, but seems to be unsupported by
authority. The case is based on what appears to be an unwarranted application of "unfair competition" rules to a "trade-mark" case.
Canal Co. v. Clark, 8o U. S. 311, 327 (187).

Elgin Wratch Co. v. Ill. Watch Co., T79 U. S. 665 (igoo).
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has been fancifully and arbitrarily appropriated. Such words have
been held to be good trademarks, on the theory the word is not within
the rule unless it is used in a geographical sense, as indicative of the
place of origin of the goods.8 Thus the words "German" and
"Vienna" when fancifully used have been held to be susceptible of
appropriation as trademarks. A word is not a geographic name
merely because some portion of the earth's surface is called by it.10
The recent decision in Apollo v. Perkins"' refuses to recognize
this exception and holds that no geographical name whether used
merely fancifully or to designate the place of origin of the goods can
be the subject of a valid trademark. In this case protection was
sought for the name "Nubia" as applied to cigarettes. "Nubia,"
although the name of a province in Africa, had been arbitrarily
selected as a name for the cigarettes and was in no way related to
them or to the tobacco from which they were made. It was held
that regulative relief against unfair competition might be granted if
the facts necessitated it, but that it was not entitled to prohibitive
relief as a trademark. It is submittedthat this decision is opposed to
the great weight of authority, and that the two cases cited by the
court do not bear it out. These cases 12 were not concerned with a
geographical name arbitrarily selected, but with a name used in
geographical sense, which they properly held cannot become a trademark.
The result of the decision in Apollo v. Perkins would seem to
be more logical, though less equitable, than the weight of authority
to which it is opposed. The inconsistency of the rule allowing the
appropriation of a geographical name as a trademark can be shown
by an example. Suppose A has a trademark in the name "X," Z,
geographical name, but arbitrarily selected. B, who lives in X, desires to manufacture the same article and calls it "X," the true name
of the place of manufacture. If, as by hypothesis, A has trademark
rights in the name "X," this right is exclusive and he will be entitled
to protection against B. The result, therefore, will be in conflict
with the fundamental rule concerning geographical names as trade-

'In re Magnolia. Metal Co.s Trade-Mark (1897), 2 Ch. 371 (Eng.);

Drake v. Glessner, 68 Ohio St 337 (19o3); Colgate v. Adams, 88 Fed. Rep.
899 (x898); Carmel Wine Co. v. Palestine Wine Co., 161 Fed. Rep. 654
(i9o8); Sanders v. Utt, 16 Mo. App. 322 (1884); Rose v. McLean Pub. Co.,
24 Ont. App. Rep. 24o (x897).
'Fleischmann v. Schuckmann, 62 How. Pr. 92 (N. Y. 1881); Walter
Baker & Co. v. Baker, 77 Fed. Rep. I81 (i896).
1
In re Magnolia Metal Co.'s Trade-Mark, supra, n. 8.
2o7 Fed. Rep. 530 (1913), reversing decree granted in 197 Fed. Rep. 476.
'Elgin Watch Co. v. Ill. Watch Co., 179 U. S. 665 (igoo) ; New York
& R. Cement Co. v. Coplay Cement Co., 44 Fed. Rep. 277 (i8go), Id. 45
Fed. Rep. 212.
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marks, viz., that no man can acquire such rights in a name as to
enable him to restrain another from truthfully calling his goods by
the name of their place of origin. But the result of the decision in
Apollo v. Perkins, if followed to its logical extreme, will not befound entirely satisfactory. If, as this case holds, no geographical
name can ever become a trademark, it will mean that a man who
has fancifully selected as a trademark a name which he believes
he has himself invented may later be denied protection because the
name happens to be the name of a small town or 'district-a fact of
which he was wholly ignorant at the time he applied the name to
his product. This is obviously unfair to the manufacturer, and it
is no answer to say that he may yet be protected against unfair
competition. That protection is far inferior to that to which a
trademark is entitled, and if a man adopts what he conceives to be a
fancy name for his product, it is submitted that he should not be
disentitled to protection merely because the name happens to be a
geographical name:
The best solution of the problem is probably that arrived at
by Judge Gaynor in Clinton Metallic Paint Co. v. New York Paint
Co."3 A geographical name "may be exclusively appropriated as a
mere arbitrary or fanciful name for an article generally known not
to be of such place or country and not represented to be such, against
every person subsequently offering a similar article, except such
article be of such place or country. One so using such a name arbitrarily or fancifully may only have another restrained from using
it in the same way, but not from using it truthfully, viz., in its actual
meaning." This rule, though perhaps not entirely consistent with
the theory that a trademark is an exclusive right, will avoid the
difficulties of the two other rules discussed and will work out substantial justice between all the parties.
T. R., Jr.

WILLS-SIGNING--In view of the enormous amount of litigation that has arisen over the signing of wills it is rather extraordinary that no court has stopped to really analyze the fundamental
meaning of the word. In order to sign an instrument two things
must occur. There must be, first, an actual marking of the paper.
And in the case of wills it has been held that this may be done by
a mark' or an engraved name 2 or false names and under many

35o N. Y. S. 437 (1898). See also Newman v. Alford, 51 N. Y. 189 (1872).
' Taylor v. Dening, 3 Nev. & P. 228 (Eng. 1838) ; Schieffelin v. Schieffelin,
127 Ala. 14 (1899): Rook v. Wilson, 142 Ind. 24 (i895); Scott v. Hawk,
1o7 Iowa, 723 (898) ; Nickerson v. Buch, 12 Cush. 332 (Mass. I853); In re
Cozzen's Will, 6I Pa. 196 (1869).
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statutes may be done by some one else for the testator. Secondly,
there must be an intent not merely to sign, as is usually stated, but
an intent to affix this mark to a completed instrument in order to
give it validity. For if it is intended that the instrument shall be
added to or filled in, it is spoken of as signing in blank and not
signing.. But no statute provides for signing a will in blank.
Under the Statute of Frauds a will was merely required to be
signed, and it was unimportant in what part of the instrument the
signature appeared. So a will beginning---"I John Stanley'-was
held sufficiently signed if the testator did not intend any further
signing.4 And under similar statutes this construction has been followed in America, 5 even when the will was not written by the testatrix,6 since.it was written *ather direction and the intention that it
should be a signature was clear. But without a clear intent to
make it such it is no more than a formal recital of the name.7 In
every case it is essential that the testator shall have the intent when
he signs that the name shall give validity to the whole instrument.8
Clearly that intent cannot apply to more than the testator has in
mind at the time, therefore in order to give validity to words written
afterwards he must at that time intend to write additional words.
In a recent New Jersey case, however, where a testator after
writing and signing his will, inserted a bequest of an automobile,
then-published and acknowledged his signature and had it attested,
the majority of the court held that the will with the interlineation
had been signed within the meaning of the statute.9 The New Jersey
'Goods of Emerson, L. R. 9 Ir. 443" (1882) ; Jenkins v. Gaisford, 3 Sw. &
Tr. 93 (Eng. 1863).
'It bonis Redding, 2 Rob. 339 (Eng. 185o); Long v. Zook, 13 Pa. 4oo

(85o).

'Lemayne v. Stanley, 3 Lev. i (Eng. i68o); Morrison v. Turnour, I8
Ves. 176 (Eng. 1811).

'Armstrong v. Armstrong, 29 Ala. 538 (1857) ; Kolowski v. Tausz, io3
Ill. App. 528 (i9o2); Upchurch v. Upchurch, i6 B. Mon. io2 (Ky. 1855);
Booth v. Timoney, 3 Dem. Sur. 416 (N, Y. 1885) (construing the New Jersey
Statute); Adams v. Field, 21 Vt. 256 (1849).
' Sarah Miles' Will, 4 Dana, i (Ky. 1836).
"Catlett v. Catlett, 55 Mo. 330 (1874) ; Ramsey v. Ramsey, 13 Grat. 664

(Va. 1857); Warwich v. Warwich, 86 Va. 596 (i8go) (the statute requiring
intent in this case being no more than declarative of the common law).
' This becomes especially important in cases where the statute requires
the will to be signed at the end, for in order to find the end the court must
first determine what the testator contemplated as the completed instrument.
Heise v. Heise, 31 Pa. 246 (1858); Hays v. Harden, 6 Pa. 413 (1847);
Glancy v. Glancy, 17 Ohio, 134 (i866); Baker v. Baker, 5i Ohio, 217 (894).
And a large part of the conflict of decisions on this point is due to the difference of opinion as to what constituted the whole will in the testator's
mind.
I In re Bullivant's Will, 88 Atl. Rep. io93 (N. J. 1913).
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statute 10 requires that a will "shall be in writing, and shall be signed
by the testator, which signature shall be made by the testator, or
the making thereof acknowledged by him, and such writing declared
to be his last will, in the presence of two witnesses .
who
shall subscribe." The court argued that inasmuch as a testator may
adopt as his signature a mark he could equally well adopt his own
signature previously made, and that this acknowledgment when
attested would satisfy the statute.
Great stress is laid on the fact that whereas the statute requires the witnesses to subscribe, the testator need only sign, but
in so doing the court has failed to appreciate the second half of the
meaning of the word sign. Obviously the testator's intention when
he signed was that the will was completed as it stood, and not that
the signature should include what he might think of later. Consequently the bequest of the automobile was not signed by the previous
signature and the acknowledgment cannot amount to a signing, since
no matter what the intent may be there is no actual marking of the
paper. This is practically the view taken by Garrison, J., in the
dissenting opinion. He held that the acknowledgment can not amount
to more than affirming the signature as of the time when written.
When the statute requires signing at the foot or end of the will,
the case under its exact facts has gone the other way.1" And since
the basis of the decision is that an acknowledgment of a prior signature is not the equivalent of an actual signing, the decision would
seem in point, in spite of the difference in the statute.
T. S.P.
WILLs-VEsTED REMAINDERs-After -a gift of a life estate,
there was a provision that, in the event of the death of the beneficiaries, that portion of the property devised to their use should be
equally divided among the three named children of the testatrix's
brother, "or as many as might be living at that time." It was held 1
that the children living at the death of the testatrix took a vested
estate, subject to be divested upon the death of one or more of them
during the continuance of the life estate.
This decision seems to be wholly in accord with principle and
authority. In England, in several cases practically the same words
were used and the court without hesitation held the interest to be
vested. 2 In America, the particular provision has rarely been beSt. 1910, p. 5867, pl. 24.
"Casement v. Fulton, 5 Moore P. C. i3o (Eng. 1845); Matter of Foley,
104 Comp.

76 Misc. Rep. i68 (N. Y. 1912).
'White v. Smith, 89 Atl. Rep. 272 (Conn. 1914).
'Sturges v. Pearson. 4 Mad. 411 (Eng. i819); In re Saunders' Trust,
i L. R. Eq. Cas. 675 (1866); Penny v. Commissioners, L. R. [i9oo] App.

Cas. 628.
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fore the court.8 However, American cases are not infrequent where
the gift over is either to a number of persons or the survivors, or
survivor of them, or to a number of persons, with the provision
.that, in case of death of any of those designated before the estate
should rest in enjoyment, the children or issue of such deceased
should take in his or her stead. These cases generally hold that the
members of the original group take vested interests, subject only to
a divesting in the event of their death before the time arrives when
the gift takes effect in possession. 4 Such a provision in favor of
a number of persons or survivors of them at the termination of the
preceding estate is regarded as the same in legal effect as that which
appears in the will under construction. 5 The cases have simply followed the apparent analogy between the two situations and have
looked upon a limitation over, such as made in this case, or one to
several persons or the survivor of them, as creating a vested interest
in the original donees with a substitutionary provision in. the event
of the death of one or more of them before the time of the vesting
in possession. Furthermore, in its essence the situation created is
like that which results from a limitation over to a single person, and
in the event of his death to others, as for example, his children or
issue. Gifts over of this latter character are frequent and held to
create a vested interest in the original donee subject to a divesting.6
The Connecticut court recognized and was governed by the distinction between a limitation over to such of the members of a group
of designated persons as might be living at the death of a life tenatt
and one to the group of the survivors or survivor of them. If the
alternative language used is to be interpreted as equivalent to the
first, the cases are in accord in holding that there could be no vesting before the death of the life tenant.7 Such, however, is neither
the interpretation nor the effect which the courts have given to the
provision like that before us and similar ones. In the first the
identity of the person is left to future ascertainment; it speaks as
of the future and deals only with conditions which may then exist.
The latter, including that of the case under discussion, on the con'Weatherford v. Boulware,

1o2 Ky. 466 (1897).
'Jeffers v. Lampson, io Ohio St. r02 (z859); Darling v. Blanchard, iop
Mass. 176 (187,); Thaw v. Ritchie. 136 U. S. 519 (x8go); Heilman v. Hellman, r29 Ind. 59 (i89i) ; Crane v. Bollis, 49 N. J. Eq. 373 (1892).

5Brown v. Kenyon, 3 Mad. 410 (Eng. 1818); In re Saunders' Trust,

supra, n. 2.

'Allen v. Almy, 89 At. Rep. 205 (Conn. 1913).
'Doe d. Planner v. Scudamore, 2 B. & P. 289 (Eng. x8oo); McElride v.
Smyth, 54 Pa. 245 (1867), in which it was said that a gift to such of a
number of persons as may meet a defined description is not a gift to all the
persons whether they meet the description or not; Thomson v. Ludington, o4
Mass. 193 (1870); Andrews v. Rice, "53 Conn. 566 (1885); Robinson v.
Palmer, 9o Me. 246 (1897).
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trary, speak in the present and give as of the present to persons in
existence when they speak. Future contingencies which may arise
during the continuance of the intervening estate are provided for, but
only in a substitutionary way. The primary provision is that all
shall take. That which may by possibility defeat the result is alternative. This distinction is clearly brought out by Gray, in his work
on perpetuities, s where he says: "Whether a remainder is vested or
contingent depends upon the language employed. If the conditional
element is incorporated into the description of, or the gift to, the
remainderman, then the remainder is contingent; but if, after words
giving a vested interest, a clause is added divesting it, the remainder
is vested. Thus, on a devise to A for life, remainder to his children,
but if any child dies in the lifetime of A his slhare to go to those
who survive, the share of each child is vested, subject to be divested
by its death. But on a devise to A for life, remainder to such of his
children as survive him, the remainder is contingent."
Where a remainder is given to A or his heirs, or to a class or
their heirs, and possession only is postponed, the present rule is that
the remaindermen who survive the testator take vested interests,
which are not defeated by their death during the life tenancy.9 In
such case if any dip during the life tenancy, their interests pass to
their representatives. Should the mere fact that, instead of allowing
the representatives to take, a substitutionary gift is provided for
make any difference? In vested remainders the estate is invariably
fixed to remain to a determinate person, after the particular estate
is spent. In contingent remainders the estate in remainder is limited
to take effect either to a dubious and uncertain person, or upon a
dubious and uncertain event; so that the particular estate may chance
to be determined and the remainder never take effect.10 The remainder in question is limited to ascertained persons in being at the
time with present capacity of taking possession were the particular
estate to determine. Those entitled to the remainder were subject
to no condition precedent which would prevent its taking effect in
possession if the particular estate were to terminate immediately.'
The contingency, if we so regard it, in this case was plainly subsequent and had nothing to do with the vesting of the interest. The
remainder, being vested according to the legal meaning of the words
of gift, is not to be held contingent by virtue of subsequent provision of the will, unless the provisions necessarily require it.12
'Gray, Rule against Perpetuities, §io8.
"Underhill, Wills, Vol. I, p. 477.
102 Blackstone, 168, i69.
"In Ducker v. Burham, 146 Ill. 9 (1893), it is said: "Whether the condition is really precedent or subsequent depends upon whether it is corporated
into the gift, or description of. the remainderman, or is added as a separate clause afterwards, which words have already given a vested interest."
McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340 (885).
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The decision also finds support in the policy of the law, which
favors the vesting of estates. The language of an instrument is
always, if possible, construed as creating a vested rather than a contingent remainder.'13 When it is doubtful whether the words of contingency applied to the gift itself, or to the time of enjoyment, they
will be construed as applying to the latter." Moreover, to create a
contingent remainder the intent to that end on the part of the testator must be so clearly indicated as to practically leave no room
for construction."
S.L.M.
'Tiffany on Real Property, p. 275; Smith's Appeal, 23 Pa. St. 9 (1854);
Heilman v. Heilman, supra, n. 4; Farnam v. Farnam, 53 Conn. 261 (1885),
where it is said, it ought to be given that construction if its language will
fairly admit of it.
"Robinson v. Palmer, supra, n. 7; Eldridge v. Eldridge, 9 Cush. Vx6
(Mass. 1852).

Gardner on Wills, 5o8.

